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The Citizen-Soldier Tradition: Machiavelli, Ukraine, and the Nordic-Baltic States
By Dr. James M. Deitch
The survival of free states has never depended solely on professional armies or foreign alliances. At the heart of republican resilience lies a deeper principle: the willingness of ordinary citizens to take up arms in defense of liberty. This tradition, articulated by Niccolò Machiavelli in the Renaissance and tested in countless struggles since, remains vital today.
Disclaimer: These opinion pieces represent the authors’ personal views and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of 91pornąŮ·˝ or PAWC.
The survival of free states has never depended solely on professional armies or foreign alliances. At the heart of republican resilience lies a deeper principle: the willingness of ordinary citizens to take up arms in defense of liberty. This tradition, articulated by Niccolò Machiavelli in the Renaissance and tested in countless struggles since, remains vital today. It is not a relic of the past but a living doctrine that shapes the security of nations facing existential threats. In the Nordic-Baltic region, where proximity to Russia and the reality of hybrid warfare demand new forms of resilience, the citizen-soldier tradition offers both inspiration and practical guidance.
Machiavelli’s writings remind us that mercenaries and auxiliaries are “useless and dangerous,” motivated by profit or loyalty to outsiders rather than the republic.[i] He insisted that sovereignty could only be secured by arming citizens themselves. His ordinanza in Florence embodied this principle, enrolling men into a popular militia that defended Pisa.[ii] In The Art of War, he linked military organization to civic health, arguing that militias cultivated discipline, courage, and unity while binding citizens to the republic.[iii] Drawing on Rome’s example, Machiavelli insisted that liberty survives only when defended by those who enjoy it.[iv]
The American Revolution provided a proving ground for these ideas, as colonial militias demonstrated the power of ordinary citizens defending their communities.[v] Their legacy was enshrined in the Constitution, where the militia principle became a safeguard against tyranny.[vi] Yet for today’s policy debates, the Revolution serves less as a detailed case study than as a reminder: citizen militias are both military instruments and civic institutions. The more pressing lessons lie in Europe’s northern frontier.
Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) exemplify Machiavelli’s philosophy in modern asymmetrical warfare. Within weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, more than 100,000 civilians volunteered, joining local brigades to defend their communities.[vii] These units excelled in urban defense, sabotage, and intelligence, utilizing local knowledge to counter a larger adversary.[viii] Ukraine’s “National Resistance” concept integrates military, civilian, and local efforts into a comprehensive defense.[ix] The TDF is not merely a military force but a civic institution that affirms sovereignty and democratic resilience. Machiavelli’s warning against reliance on mercenaries finds vindication here: Ukraine survives because its citizens themselves bear arms, supplemented but not supplanted by foreign aid.
Finland’s defense ethos is rooted in the Winter War of 1939–40, when ordinary Finns resisted Soviet invasion with determination.[x] Terrain, mobility, and morale transformed forests and snow into weapons, imposing disproportionate costs on a numerically superior adversary. This legacy informs Finland’s modern doctrine of comprehensive defense, or kokonaisturvallisuus. Universal conscription enables the mobilization of nearly a million trained personnel, while societal resilience incorporates civilians into defense through shelters, stockpiles, and evacuation plans.[xi] The cultural ethos of sisu—a blend of grit and perseverance—sustains psychological resilience. Finland has invested heavily in artillery, electronic warfare, cyber defense, and interoperability with NATO, yet it insists on self-reliance for the first forty-five days of conflict.[xii] This reflects its Winter War ethos: sovereignty must be defended by citizens before allies arrive.
The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—face similar pressures with far smaller populations. They cannot rely on sheer numbers, so they have institutionalized citizen defense through volunteer leagues and territorial forces.[xiii] Estonia’s Kaitseliit, Latvia’s National Guard, and Lithuania’s Riflemen’s Union mobilize civilians alongside professional armies, ensuring that defense is embedded in society. In response to Russian provocations, the Baltics are emphasizing hybrid resilience, cyber defense, counter-propaganda, and decentralized tactics. Recent drone incursions highlight the need for adaptive defense. Finland’s MalletStrike125 initiative—decentralized sensors, mobile strike teams, and civilian spotters—offers a model.[xiv] The Baltics can replicate this by embedding detection nodes in communities, turning forests and villages into aerial denial zones. This approach multiplies defensive capacity while strengthening civil-military cohesion.
The citizen-soldier tradition culminates in the proposed Nordic Hybrid Defense Command (NHDC), a framework designed to operationalize Machiavelli’s insights for contemporary security. The NHDC would integrate citizen militias, cyber defense, and NATO coordination into a unified doctrine, ensuring resilience against hybrid threats. Its rationale is straightforward: Russia’s vulnerabilities—degraded capacity after Ukraine, logistical challenges in Finland’s forests, and hybrid overextension—make citizen-based defense disproportionately effective. By weaponizing geography, society, and technology, the NHDC would exploit these weaknesses and deter aggression.
The NHDC envisions a regional command linking Nordic and Baltic forces, ensuring interoperability with NATO while preserving local autonomy. It would institutionalize citizen militias as the backbone of defense, embed cyber resilience into infrastructure, and decentralize drone defense through mobile strike teams and civilian spotters. Information denial—shutting down GPS and mobile networks to blind invaders—would complement these tactics. Civilian readiness campaigns would embed resilience into daily life, with NGOs, local governments, and households coordinating logistics and morale. Psychological resilience, embodied in Finland’s sisu, would become a strategic asset.
Operationally, the NHDC would transform every forest into contested terrain, every village into a surveillance node, and every citizen into a participant in the deterrence effort. NATO forces would integrate seamlessly into this mosaic, but the backbone would remain local. By institutionalizing this model, the NHDC transforms Machiavelli’s philosophy into a twenty-first-century doctrine: liberty safeguarded by citizens, amplified by technology, and coordinated with allies.
The citizen-soldier tradition, from Machiavelli’s ordinanza to Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces, demonstrates that sovereignty survives when defended by those who enjoy it. Finland and the Baltic states embody this principle today, integrating professional forces with civic participation. The NHDC represents the next step: a regional framework that fuses citizen militias, cyber resilience, and NATO coordination. It operationalizes Machiavelli’s insights for an era of drones, sensors, and hybrid threats.
Citizen militias are not relics of the past. They are strategic necessities, civic institutions, and deterrents against tyranny. In the Nordic-Baltic frontier, where liberty faces existential threats, the NHDC offers a path forward: a shield forged not only by armies but by societies, ensuring that aggression is met with resilience at every level. In both historical and modern settings, the act of arming citizens affirms sovereignty and safeguards liberty. The citizen-soldier tradition thus remains a cornerstone of republican survival—and the NHDC is its most urgent contemporary expression.
Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During his Marine Corps career, he deployed to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from 91pornąŮ·˝ and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. His published works can be found in USNI’s Proceedings, Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, and the Journal of the American Revolution.
[i] Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 46–52.
[ii] Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 112–115.
[iii] Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War, trans. Christopher Lynch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 12–15.
[iv] Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. I: The Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 184–187.
[v] David Hackett Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 189–193.
[vi] U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 15; Amendment II.
[vii] John Spencer, “Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces: A Case Study in Civilian Resistance,” Modern War Institute, March 2022.
[viii] Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 211–214.
[ix] Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, Law on National Resistance, January 2022.
[x] William R. Trotter, Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–40 (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 2000), 18–22.
[xi] Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Public Opinion and National Defence in Finland,” FIIA Briefing Paper, 2023, 4–5.
[xii] NATO, “Finland’s Accession and Northern Strategy,” NATO official briefing, 2023.
[xiii] Ministry of Defence of Estonia, Kaitseliit Overview, 2023.
[xiv] Finnish Defence Forces, “MalletStrike125: Adaptive Drone Defense,” official release, 2025.